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The other assignments of error are not sustained. The mere
fact that the personal property was worth much more than it
brought at the sheriff's sale was of no importance in itself, and
the charge given to the jury upon the facts in evidence was
entirely accurate. But for the first reason we have mentioned, a
new venire must be ordered.
Judgment reversed, and a venire de novo awarded.

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.

Court of Ezckequer.
WILSON v. THE NEWPORT DOOK COMPANY.
The defendants, owners of docks in a river, agreed with the plaintiff, a shipowner,
to receive his ship into their docks. When the time came for receiving the ship,
they were unable to do so. The ship lay in the river, and, as the tide fell, she
stranded, broke her back, and was seriously damaged. In an action for the breach
of the contract to receive the ship into the dock, the plaintiff sought to recover for
the injury to the ship as special damage. The judge asked the jury, first, whether
there was a place of safety to which the ship might have been taken; and, if so,
secondly, whether the captain or pilot had been guilty of negligence in not taking
her there. The jury gave no answer to the first question, but, to the second,
answered that the captain and pilot did the best they could under the circumstances,
and were neither of them guilty of any negligence. The judge thereupon directed
a verdict for the plaintiff for the damages claimed.
Held (per PoLLoc,
C. B., CHAwwELL and PIGOTT, BB.), that, upon the
finding of the jury, the court could not decide whether the plaintiff was entitled to
the damages claimed or not.
Held (per MAnTIx, B.), that the plaintiff was entitled to the damages claimed.
Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. S41, commented upon.

THE declaration was for the breach of a contract to receive the

plaintiff's ship into the defendant's dock, alleging, as special
damage, that the ship, being left in the river, as the tide fell,
grounded and sustained injury.
The defendants paid £15 into court.
The plaintiff replied that this sum was insufficient; upon which
issue was joined.
The action was tried before BmL-Es, J., at the last Monmouthshire Summer Assizes, and the facts proved were as follows:
The defendants were the proprietors of a wet-dock upon the Usk,
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at Newport. In November 1863, the plaintiff's ship, Lord
Elgin, was in a dry-dock higher up the river. The plaintiff
wished to remove his ship to the defendants' dock, but for some
time they had no room for her. On the 17th -November they
sent word to the captain that they could receive the ship if she
came down with the first tide. In the morning she was towed
down accordingly, the captain and a pilot being in charge of her.
When she reached the dock-gates, the defendants, in consequence
of an accident, were unable to take her in. The wind was rising
at the time. A discussion took place between the captain and
the pilot as to what should be done; but ultimately she was
anchored in the river opposite the dock. As the tide fell she
stranded on a bank and broke her back, and considerable expense
was incurred in repairing her. There was a conflict of testimony
as to whether she might safely have been taken up .the river
again, or to a secure anchorage lower down, or into deep water.
It was doubtful whether she was sufficiently ballasted to be safely
taken into deep water.
The plaintiff sought to recover the expense of repairing the
damage thus done to the ship. The sum paid into court covered
the expense of bringing the ship down the river to the dock-gates.
The learned judge left two questions to the jury-first, whether
there was a place of safety to which the vessel might have been
taken ? Secondly, if so, whose fault was it that she was not taken
there ? was it the captain's or the pilot's ? As to the first ques
tion the jury could not agree. To the second they replied that
the captain and pilot did the best they could under the circumstances, and were neither of them guilty of any negligence.
The learned judge thereupon directed a verdict for the plaintiff,
the amount to be ascertained out of court, with leave to the
defendants to move to enter a verdict for themselves, the court to
be at liberty to draw inferences of fact.
Huddleston, Q. C., in Michaelmas Term, accordingly obtained
a rule nisi to enter a verdict for the defendants, on the ground
that the damages were too remote ; or for a new trial, on the
ground that, upon the finding of the jury, the plaintiff was not
entitled to the verdict.
HMellish, Q. C., Cooke, Q. C., and 1Dowdeswell, now showed
cause.-The damage here is a direct injury to the subject-matter
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of the contract, not consequential damage within the meaning of
Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341; and the rule in that case is
not to be extended to dissimilar cases: Smeed v. Ford, 7 W. R.
266, 1 E. & E. 616; Gibbs v. The Liverpool Docks, 5 W. R.
74, 1 H. & N. 439; Collen v. Wright, 5 W. R. 265, 7 E. & B.
301; Randall v. Raper, 6 W. R. 445, E. B. & E. 81; Bridge
v. The Grand Junction Railway Company, 3 M. & W. 224;
Davis v. Garrett, 6 Bing. 716.
Huddleston, Q. 0., Gray, Q. C., and Henry James, in support of the rule, cited Hadley v. Baxendale, ubi sup.; Fletcher
v. Tayleur, 17 0. B. 21; 1 Sedg. on Dam. 57-67, 2d ed.
The court being divided, the following judgments were delivered
MARTIN, B. (after recapitulating the facts proved).-The question of damages is of constant occurrence, it arises in almost
every action of contract except contracts for the payment of a
certain fixed sum of money, and necessarily in every action for a
wrong. Ordinary cases on contracts are actions for the non.
delivery or non-acceptance of goods agreed to be sold, on agreements for the sale of land, for breaches of promises to marry, for
non-acceptance or non-delivery of stock or shares, and an infinite
variety of others might be named. So, also, in actions for wrongs
it occurs every day; for instance, in actions for injuries sustained
by accidents on railways, and by collision, which now constitute
a very considerable number of the causes tried at Nisi Prius ; in
actions for libel and slander and for assaults or false imprisonment,
and in numberless other cases. In some instances the measure
of damages is fixed and ascertained by long-established usage;
for instance, for the non-delivery of goods which are the subjectmatter of common sale in the market, I apprehend a judge is
bound to tell the jury that the measure of damages is the difference
between the contract price and the market price, and that if he
does not his summing up would be liable to objection; and there
are other cases in which like long usage has fixed the measure of
damages. So also in some case the matter of damages has been
the subject of decision in the superior. courts, and I apprehend
that when this has been so the decision is a binding authority
upon the same and other courts in like manner and to the same
extent as other decisions. For instance, the case of Hadley v.
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Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, which was frequently referred to in the
argument, is a decision of this kind. The plaintiffs, who were
millers, had delivered to the defendants, common carriers of goods
for hire, at Gloucester, a broken iron shaft to be carried by them
to Greenwich and delivered to an engineer there in order to enable
him to use it as a model for making a new shaft. They were told
that the mill was stopped in consequence of the shaft being broken,
and they promised that if the shaft was sent before a certain hour
it would be delivered at Greenwich on the following morning.
The delivery of the shaft was delayed by some neglect, and the
plaintiffs did not receive the new shaft for several days after the
time they otherwise would have done ; and they claimed damages
for the loss of profit which they would have made had the new
shaft been delivered earlier. The late Mr. Justice CRo-.PTON
left the case generally to the jury, who found a verdict for the
plaintiffs ; a rule was granted by the Court of Exchequer for a
new trial for misdirection, because they were of opinion that the
judge ought to have told the jury to exclude the loss of profit.
This case is, therefore, an authority that in a similar case such
loss of profits cannot be made an element of damages, and must
be excluded ; but it is an authority no further, and anything said
by the court in delivering judgment is to be judged by its being
consonant to law and reason. The decision in .Hadleyv. Baxendale is therefore no authority whatever in the present case, for
no loss of profits is claimed, nor is it an authority that loss of
profit is not a legitimate element of damages in many other casesfor instance, in a railway accident whereby a tradesman or workman is prevented from attending to his business by the injury
sustained, the loss of his profits in such cases is a constant element of damages, and in a case tried the other day at Liverpool,
where so large a sum as £7000 was given in a ease under Lord
Campbell's Act, the sole element of damages was the loss of
profits of the deceased in his profession of a surgeon, and no
objection was made on this ground, and I have no doubt whatever
that if the judge had told the jury to exclude it there would have
been misdirection. In regard to the present case there is no
established rule and no decision, and the general rule is to be
applied. This rule is-that the damage to be compensated for
ought to be proximate to and not remote from the breach of contract or the wrong, and ought, fairly, and reasonably, and natu-
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rally, to arise from them. I do not adopt the qualifications
mentioned by M
Nr. Baron ALDERsoN in the judgment in Hadley
v. Baxendale, as applicable to every case. They may have been
right there, but they are not of universal application. Naturally,
he says, "means according to the usual course of things." But
contracts are infinite in variety ; and suppose, as in this case, no
such claim of damage has ever been known to have been made,
no usual course of things exists, but the damages to be recovered
against the plaintiff are not, in my opinion, therefore, to be
nominal. And he proceeds to say "or such as may reasonably
be supposed to have been in contemplation of both parties at the
time they made the contract as the probable result of the breach
of it." Now this may properly enough be taken into consideration in the case of carriers and their customers, but in the bulk
of broken contracts it has no application whatever. Parties
entering into contracts contemplate that they will be performed
and not broken; and, in the infinite majority of instances, the
damages to arise from the breach never enter into their contemplation at all. As to Hadley v. Baxendale, I was a party to'it,
and have no desire to depreciate it. But in B3oyd v. Fitt, 16 Ir.
C. L. 43, the Court of Exchequer dissented from it, and approved
of the views of the late Mr. Justice CROMPToN and Sir JAMES
WrLDE as being sounder exposition of the law as to remoteness
of damages: Smeed v. Ford, 7 W. R. 266, El. & El. 616; Gee
v. Lancashire and Yorkshire BRailway Company, 9 W. R. 103,
6 H. & N. 221. The general rule is, therefore, to be applied to
the present case, and ought, as all other general rules, to be
fairly, candidly, and impartially applied. It has been said that
the damage sustained here has been very great. Now, I am
clearly of opinion that this ought to be no element whatever in
the application'of the rule, and whether the damages be £10 or
£10,000 is immaterial. The circumstances are these :-In pursuance of the defendants' contract to admit the ship into the dock
at a certain time upon a certain day, the ship was brought to the
entrance of the dock. The defendants could not admit her in
consequence of a defect in a chain of the dock-gate, and their
contract is admitted to have been broken. No blame attaches to
them. It was their misfortune that the chain had been broken.
The ship was then left in the river, which is one emptying itself
into the Bristol Channel, where the tide flows and ebbs to a very
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great height. The captain had to decide what was to be done
under the circumstances in which he was placed. Four courses
have been suggested as open to him-one, that he should remain
and anchor where he was; secondly, that he should have gone up
the river towards the place from whence he came; thirdly, that
he should have gone down to West Point, where, it was said, the
ship would, upon the ebb, have settled upon soft mud; and,
fourthly, that he should have gone into deep water, where the
ship would have always been afloat. Now I think the defendants
had a right to a bod fide and reasonably sound judgment exercised upon this matter. The captain decided upon remaining
where he was; the tide was ebbing and the weather threatening.
If any of the other three courses had been adopted, it might have
been that the ship would have sustained no damage; but it might
have been that she would have been totally lost. But I think
this was a question for the jury, and that they have decided it.
They have found that the captain did the best he could under the
circumstances, and was not guilty of any negligence. The consequence was, that when the tide ebbed, the ship took the ground
and sustained damage; and the question which has been argued
before us is, that the damage is too remote, and so unconnected
with the cause of action, that it must, as a matter of law, be borne
by the plaintiff, and that the defendants cannot be responsible for
it. I do not concur in this view. There has been damage. It
must be borne by some one. Neither the plain.tiff nor his captain
are in the slightest default. If the defendants had performed
their contract, no damage would have occurred. In consequence
of their default the captain was compelled to exercise his judgment
and discretion; and the jury have found that he did the best he
could, and was guilty of no negligence, by which I understood
that in deciding to remain where he was he exercised such judgment and discretion as became a reasonable and prudent man.
His doing so was, no doubt, the immediate cause of the damage,
but in my opinion his remaining there was, in contemplation of
law, the same as if the ship had been compelled to remain there
by a vis major. The rule is that the damage must be proximate
(not immediate), and fairly and reasonably connected with the
breach of contract or wrong. As to what is so, different minds
will differ, but many instances could be mentioned in which
damages much more remote than the present were held to be the
VOL. XIV.-48
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subject of compensation: Powell v. Salisbury, 2 Y. & J. 394.
There is a case of constant occurrence at Guildhall-A barge is
injured by a collision in the Thames,*she is taken to the nearest
convenient and fitting place on the shore ; upon the ebbing of the
tide she comes down upon a pile and sustains further damage.
y own belief is that compensation for such damage has been
recovered over and over again without objection, and upon referring to some gentlemen of the bar, whose experience upon the
subject is the greatest in the profession, I have been informed
that it has constantly been so. Such damage is precisely analogous to the present.
Some possible cases were mentioned in the argument, and it
was asked whether the defendants would have been responsible;
one was, if the ship has been run down by another ship when at
anchor. I think the liability in such case would depend upon the
circumstances, and the material one would be whether the runningdown ship was in the wrong. Another case put was, if the ship
had been upset, when she was anchored, by a hurricane. That,
I think, would raise a question for the jury whether, in all human
probability, the same misfortune would not have happened to the
ship wherever in the river she happened to have been. In my
opinion the discussion of instances like these is of very little
bearing or weight when the facts of the case to be adjudicated
upon are clear and well-defined.
In questions of damages each case must be determined upon its
own circumstances. But I think the point is decided by authority: Jones v. Boyce, 1 Stark. N. P. C. 495. The plaintiff was
a passenger by a stage-coach, a rein broke, the coachman drove
the coach towards the side of the road, and one of the wheels was
stopped by a post. The plaintiff jumped off, and his leg was
broken, and he brought the action against the coach proprietor
for damages. Lord ELLENBOROUGH said there were two questions
for the jury: first, as to the defendant's default (in regard to the
rein), which is immaterial to the present case. The second was
whether the defendant's default was conducive to the injury
which the plaintiff had sustained, for if it was not so far conducive
as to create such a reasonable degree of alarin and apprehension
on the mind of the plaintiff as rendered it necessary for him to
jump down from the coach in order to avoid immediate danger,
the action was not maintainable. Amongst observations upon the
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peculiar circumstances of the case, he said, "That it was for the
consideration of the jury whether the plaintiff's act was such as a
reasonable and prudent mind would have adopted ;" and he added,
"If I place a man in such a situation that he must adopt a perilous
alternative, I am responsible for the consequences." I think the
present case is analogous. The defendants did not perform their
contract to admit the ship into the dock. They thereby imposed
upon the captain four perilous alternatives; he adopted one. The
jury found that he did the best he could, and was guilty of no
negligence; and damage ensued to the ship. In my opinion the
defendants' default directly conduced to this damage, and they
are responsible for it upon the principle enunciated by Lord
ELLENBOROUGH in Jones v. Boyce, which is equally good law and
good sense. For these reasons I think the damage is not too
remote ; that the learned judge submitted the right question to
the jury; and I concur with him that the verdict is unobjectionable, and that therefore the rule should be discharged.
POLLOCK, C. B.-This case comes before us on a point reserved
at the trial, viz., whether the damages were too remote ; and, to
assist our judgment, we have, first, the notes of the learned judge
taken at the trial; secondly, the answer of the jury, "that the
pilot and the captain did the best they could" under the circumstances, and were "1neither of them guilty of any negligence,"
and we have the fact that the jury (who were locked up till a late
hour) could not agree on the question "whether there was in fact
any place of safety to which the vessel might have been taken ;"
and the questions for our decision seem to be-First, ought the
verdict to stand, a verdict not found by the jury, but entered for
the plaintiff by the learned judge on the jury answering one
question, and, being unable to agree upon another question, which
we think the more important and decisive of the two; secondly,
ought we to enter the verdict for the defendants; or, thirdly,
ought we to direct a new trial. In deciding these questions it is
necessary to ascertain the facts of the case as found by the jury,
for with evidence so contradictory and repugnant we cannot find
any verdict ourselves ; it is not our province. If the facts can
be ascertained, then what is the law applicable to them ? We
apprehend, when the facts are known, it is the province of the
court to say for what matters damages are to be given, but the
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amount of damages is a question for the jury quite as much as the
credit due to the witnesses. When the result of the evidence is
uncertain it is for the jury to find the facts, and, therefore, they
will often have to find whether the facts fall within the rule of law
to be laid down on the subject. The case of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9 Exch. 341, was cited at the trial, and much commented on
during the argument. That case was very much considered, the
argument took place several weeks before the judgment was given,
and I know that great pains were bestowed upon it. Lord
WENSLEYDALE, the late Baron ALDERSON, and my brother MARTIN were parties to it, and certainly it does not lessen the authority of that case that Lord CAMIPBELL, in Smeed v. Foord, 1 E. &
E. 602, said, that it merely affirmed what was to be found in
Pothier, in Chancellor Kent's Commentaries 665, in the French
Code, and in all the other authorities ; and it may be added that
Mr. Justice CRomPOi (against whose summing-up, it was directed)
said, in that same case, he agreed with it as far as it went, which
we consider to be agreeing with it altogether. That decision was
not presented as any new discovery in jurisprudence, but we
think it put in a clear and more distinct light a principle which
had been previously recognised in prior cases, and the want of
which in the English law had been pointed out. The authorities
are all collected in a note to Vi cars v. Wilcox, in 2 Smith's
Leading Cases, 4th ed., by Mr. Justice WIIIEs and Mr. Justice
KEATING.

It is quite true, as remarked by Sir JAMES WILDE in

aee v. -Lancashireand Yorkshire Bailwa!y Company, 6 H. & N.
221, that the case is not applicable to, and does not decide, every
case; no rule, no formula could do that. Cases of damage differ
as much as the leaves of a tree differ from each other, or rather
the leaves of different trees-no two are exactly alike, and one
description connot be applicable to all; no precise positive rule
can embrace all cases, and, notwithstanding any rule of law that
may be laid down, it must be admitted after all that the question
of the amount of damages is one for the jury, and the jury only;
and, provided the law on the subject be properly laid down by the
presiding judge, and then the amount of damages be left at large
to the jury, we apprehend a court would not interfere with their
verdict, because the jury had, apparently, come to some compromise among themselves, and had not strictly observed the supposed
rule of law. We think that the decision of twelve jurymen, in.
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structed from the bench in the rule of law, but exercising their
own judgment on a subject connected with the business of life,
with which they are familiar, would practically lead to a result
often more just and equitable than any mere rule of law could
arrive at, and that there 'may be no mistake as to our meaning,
we may add that, should this case go to a second trial, some of
the jury might think the plaintiff entitled to recover the whole
damage; others might think it the height of imprudence on the
part of the master to attempt to remove a vessel from a dry-dock
to a wet-dock about the time when the wind was blowing a hurricane, which, from his evidence, seems to have been the case, and
from which charge of imprudence the verdict of the jury has not
relieved him. The result might be a compromise which, we are
confident, the court would not, and which, we think, they ought
not, to disturb. We think we are not able to determine, from the
materials before us, whether or no the loss was occasioned by
circumstances which, according to the case of Hadley v. Baxendale, and the other authorities, would make the dock company
liable for the damage the ship sustained. If the state of the
weather was the efficient cause of the loss, we think the defendants are not liable. Now, as to the state of the wind, the evidence
of the mate is-" not much wind blowing; pretty stiff; a fresh
breeze." The evidence of the captain was-" It was only a few
hours before a perfect hurricane." James Dunstan, the masterrigger, says, " It was blowing so hard it would not have been
safe to take her into deep water." If the weather was such that,
on being excluded from the dock, she had no alternative bat to
perish on account of the gale or hurricane, which seems to me to
have been the opinion of the master, then it may be doubted
whether she ought to have been taken to the dock gates at all in
such a state of the weather; and the opinion of the jury, by a
verdict, should have been obtained on these and other circumstances; and the verdict ought to have been found by them on a
larger issue than whether the master and the pilot did their best,
after they found that the vessel could not be received into the
dock, which I take to be the only finding of the jury. It is clear
that the pilot thought the master was obstinate, and determined
to do nothing to save the ship. We cannot find the defendants
liable to this damage, because the jury were disposed to relieve
the captain and the pilot from the odium of a charge of negli-
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gence. The verdict of the jury ought to have gone more into the
merits, in order to fix the defendants with these damages. What
the jury did not find, and could not agree upon, was quite as
important as what they did find; and the result of their verdict
seems to be-" We cannot agree as to the liability of the defend.
*ants, but we desire to throw no blame on the captain or the pilot."
We are, therefore, of opinion that the jury have not found enough,
in point of fact, to *enable us to decide that the verdict entered
for the plaintiff is what would have been their verdict, or (referring to the evidence actually given) ought to have been, if the
entire case had been left to them to find a verdict for the plaintiff or the defendant. Looking at the evidence and the finding
of the jury, we cannot come to any conclusion that would make
the defendants responsible for the damage done to the vessel. If
there was any place of safety to which the vessel might have been
taken, and could have been taken (which we think is included in
the learned judge's question) we think the plaintiffs are not entitled to recover. The jury could not agree on an answer to this
question. If they had found this question in the affirmative, we
think the plaintiff was clearly not entitled to recover; and we
presume the judge would have directed a verdict for the defendants. But after many hours they could not agree, and it is
plain that some of the jury were of opinion in the affirmative. It
is true they found that neither the captain nor the pilot were
guilty of negligence, but we think it very uncertain what they
meant by that finding. They certainly did not mean by that
finding inferentially to decide the other question, or they would
have found it, and not ultimately disagreed about it. If there
was a safe place to which the vessel might and ought fo have lbeen
taken, a verdict for the plaintiff would be a great act of injustice,
and we are invited to find this for the jury by a process of reason, when the jury would not, apparently could not, and certainly
did not, find it for themselves. As to entering a verdict for the
defendants there is a similar difficulty (though, perhaps, not so
great, because if the plaintiff does not establish his case, the defendant is entitled to a verdict), but we think we cannot be certain
what would have been the verdict of the jury if they had gone
into, and had decided upon, the whole case for themselves. We
think, therefore, there ought to be a new trial.
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CHANNELL. B.-I wish to add a few words with the permission
of the Lord Chief Baron. I have not thought it necessary to prepare a written judgment because the question is not yet properly
laid before us. If no new light be thrown on the matter by the
finding of the jury at the second trial, it is possible that the legal
result may be that which my brother MARTIN has pointed out.
But, without deciding that, the present question is, whether the
verdict is to stand, and I think it cannot, for the case is not ripe
for decision.
PIGOTT, B.-I agree with what my brother CHA-NNELL has said.
I do not think the case ripe for decision, and on this ground I
concur in the judgment of the Lord Chief Baron.
Rule absolute for a new trial.
We had occasion a short time since to
remark on the distinction between what
are called "reportable" and "unreportable" cases. We were then discussing the case of NYoble v. Ward, 14 W. II.
397, which really added something to
the ever-increasing mass of that English
unwritten law which is supposed to be
hidden in the breasts of the judges. The
case to which we now invite our readers'
attention is, in itself, of scarcely any
appreciable importance, b~t it has been
used by the barons of the Exchequer as
a text for two most elaborate discourses
on the subject of the measure of damages
in actions of contract, and for that reason
is worthy of careful consideration. The
subject is a very difficult one, and the law
upon it can hardly be considered yet as
thoroughly settled.
The leading authority is the wellknown case of Hadley v. Baxendale, 9
Exch. 341, 2 W. I2. 602, which was decided in the Court of Exchequer, in the
year 1854, by the present Chief Baron,
Lord W'ENSLEvDALE, Baron ALDERSO-,,
and Baron MART'. Great pains, the
Chief Baron observed in the principal
case, were bestowed on the judgment,
which was delivered by AtnEasox, B.,
some weeks after the court had heard a
long argument by the present Mr. Justice

KEATING and Mr. Dowdeswell on one

side, and the present M1r. Justice WILLEs,
Mr. Whately, and Mr. Phipson on the
other. The plaintiffs in that case were
the proprietors of the Gloucester Steam
Mills, and they had delivered to the defendants, who were common carriers, a
broken iron shaft, to be carried to Greenwich, for the purpose of its being there
used as a model for a new shaft. The
defendants were informed, when the
shaft was delivered to them, that the mill
was at a standstill, and that the shaft
must be sent off immediately. In answer
to an inquiry as to when it could be
taken, the answer was that if it was sent
up at a.ny time before mid-day, it would
be delivered at Greenwich on the following day. The delivery, however, was
delayed through some neglect, and the
consequence was that the plaintiffs did
not receive the new shaft for several
days later than they ought to have done.
The working of their mill was thereby
delayed, and they accordingly sought to
recover from the defendants the profits
they would otherwise have made. It
was argued, on the part of the defendants, that these damages were too remote, but CRo trvox, J. (the judge who
presided at the trial), having left the
facts generally to the jury, they found a
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verdict for the plaintiff. A rule was
subsequently granted in the Exchequer
for a new trial, the court being of opinion that the judge ought to have told
the jury to exclude the loss of profits in
estimating the damages, and it was in
the course of the judgment that the two
principles as to the measurement of damages were enunciated, which have ever
since been regarded as authoritative.
As we shall see immediately, however,
more than one learned judge has expressed disapproval of their extension.
They were laid down by Baron ALDERSON, in the following terms :-"

Where

two parties have made a c6ntract which
one of them has broken, the damages
which the other party ought to receive in
respect of such breach of contract should
be such as may be fairly and reasonably
considered as either arising naturally,
i. e., according to the usual course of
things, from such breach of contract
itself, or such as may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation
of both parties at the time they made the
contract, as the probable result of the
breach of it." Here then are two criteria-first, the natural consequence;
and, secondly, the contemplated, though
possibly not the natural, consequence.
Now, it must be admitted that both
these tests are sound and in accordance
with the dicta of French and American
jurists, but the difficulty is in their application. Indeed, the second test is almost
unintelligible unless we adopt the explanation of it given by Cnomrvo-, J., in
Saeed v. Foord, 1 E. & E. 616, 7 W.
R. 266, that it only means that the damages should be " such as are natural, and
such as the parties would naturally look
for."

As AfRTIN, B., remarked in the

principal case, "parties when they enter
into contracts contemplate that they will
be performed and not broken, and in the
infinite majority of instances, the damages to arise from the breach never enter
into their contemplation at all." To

talk, therefore, of what the parties con
templated as a measure of damages is
really illusive, unless it be where the
contract is to pay a sum certain, when
both promissor and promissee would only
be able to contemplate one and the same
measure of damages, viz., the money
agreed to be paid, with interest. Any
attempt to apply this second test in cases
of breaches of a special contract, or of
torts, will only fortify the opinion expressed by WiLDE, B., in Gee v. Lancasireand Yorkshire Railway Company,
6 H. & N. 221, 9 W. R. 103, that although an excellent attempt was made
in Hadley v. Baxendale to lay down a
rule of practice, it has been found that
that rule will not meet all cases. "It
will probably be found practically," he
adds, "that in this (contract of bailment
with a carrier), as in many other cases
of contract, there is no measure of damages at all, and that we are seeking to
find a rule where none can be made."
The safest test, therefore, in estimating
damage is the first of the two given in
Hadley v. Baxendale, viz., that the
damage recoverable must be the natural
consequence of the breach of contract or
duty by the defendant, and what that
consequence is depends on a variety of
circumstances which will be different in
different cases. "Cases of damage,"
said the Chief Baron in the principal
case, "differ as much as the leaves of a
tree differ from each other, or rather the
leaves of different trees." It is impossible to frame an inflexible rule of law
which shall fit them all, and indeed,
when fairly considered, the decision in
Hadley v. Baxendale does not attempt to
do so. All that was said there was that
the judge ought to have told the jury not
to include loss of profits in estimating
the damages. And so at present, if an
attempt were made at the trial to prove
damages obviously too remote, it would
be the judge's duty to warn the jury to
exclude them. But, generally speaking,
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we apprehend it would be sufficient for
the judge to direct the jury to give
such damages as they considered rcasonabl.9 to bave arisen from the defendant*s default. "It must be admitted,
after all," observes the Chief Baron,
"that the question of the amount of
damages is one for the ftry, and the jury
onlyb. We think that the decision of
twelve jurymen instructed from the
bench in the rules of law, but exercising
their own judgment on a subject conneeted with the business of life with
which they are familiar, would practically lead to a result often more just
and equitable than any mere rule of law
could arrive at."
It is unnecessary to allude to the facts
of the principal case. The court were

divided in their opinion as to whether
the findings of the jury were, or were
not, sufficient to fix the defendant with
responsibility. The value of the case
solely consists in the elaborate discussions on the measure of damages contained in the judgments of POLLOCK, C.
B., and MARTi-c, B. The effect of both
judgments, we think, will be still further to limit the application of the rulesor at any rate of the second rule-in
Iadley v. Baxendale. The decision in
that case, it is gradually being discovered, contains principles which, whilst
sound in themselves, are incapable of
being applied generally in all cases of
damage arising from breach of contract
or duty.-olicitors' Journal.

Court of Common .Pleas.
SMITH v. THACKERAH AND ANOTHER.
The plaintiff was entitled to lateral support for his land, but not for the wall
upon it. The defendant dug a well in his own land, adjoining the land of the
plaintiff, and when he no longer required it, filled it up, but the material used for
the filling up sunk. The consequence was a subsidence of earth towards the place
where the well had been, and this subsidence included particles of the plaintiff's
earth, and caused the fall of the plaintiff's wall ; but there would have been no
appreciable injury to the plaintiff's land if the wall had not been upon it.
Held, that there was no cause of action.

DECLARIATION; for that the plaintiff was possessed of land,
which received lateral support from land adjoining thereto, and
the defendants dug on the said adjoining land a well near to the
land of the plaintiff, and the defendants thereby, and for the want
of keeping and continuing the sides of the well shored up, or
otherwise preventing the consequences hereinafter mentioned,
wrongfully deprived the plaintiff's land of its support, whereby it
sank and gave way, and divers walls of the plaintiff on the said
land sank and were damaged, and the plaintiff was thereby obliged
to pull down the said walls and to rebuild the same, and incurred
great expense, &c., and lost the profit which would otherwise
have accrued to him in the letting or use of the premises.
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Pleas.-Not guilty, and not possessed.
Issue on these pleas.
The facts. proved at the trial before ERLE, 0. J., at the last
Kingston Assizes. were as follows:The plaintiff was a publican at Bermondsey, and the defendants
were employed as contractors to construct a line of railway past
his premises. and for the purposes of their works they sunk a well
in a lane adjoining the plaintiff's tavern, and about one foot from
the kitchen wall. The sides of this well, which was about twenty
feet deep by ten feet in diameter, were shored up by wooden supports : but when the well was no longer required, the defendants
filled it up with loose earth, and removed the wooden supports
with which the sides were shored up. The consequence of this
was that the filling up of the well sunk nine inches in the centre,
the foundation of the wall gave way, and the wall itself had to be
shored up, and subsequently pulled down and rebuilt. It was
conceded that the plaintiff's house was a new building, and that
the right to support was in respect of the land only. There was
uncontradicted evidence of a subsidence of the plaintiff's land
caused by the siniking of the loose material with which the well
had been filled up, and that this subsidence would have occurred
even if there had been no building on the land; but the jury
found that, supposing no building to have been on the land, the
plaintiff would .not have suffered any appreciable damage; and,
on that finding, the verdict was entered for the defendants.
A rule was then obtained, pursuant to leave reserved, to enter
the verdict for the plaintiff for such sum below £15 as the court
should direct, on the ground that the facts proved at the trial
entitled the plaintiffs to the verdict without proof of any pecuniarv damage.
Joyee showed cause and contended that the defendant had only
exercised a natural right on his own land, and that if the plaintiff's land had remained in its natural state no damage would
'have happened, and that, therefore, the action was not maintainable z Bonomi v. Baekkozise, 7 W. R. 667, El. B1. & El. 63'7
Broun v. Robins, 4 H. & N. 186.
Robinson, Serjt., and Sharpe were called on to support the
rule.-As there would have been a subsidence of the plaintiff's
land, whether there was a building upon it or not, he is at least
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eltitle to noininal damages, for he is clearly entitled to lateral
Support for the land. It is actionable to deprive a man of a right
ive him iv law, though no damage has thereby been occasioned
for i,,jtio't sine danno may be the foundation of an action:
As,.y v. White, 1 Sm. Lead. Cas. 216; 2 Ld. Raym. 955;
Broom's Commentaries, p. 85, 3d ed. But, further, the plaintiff
is entitled to substantial damages, for the case is on all fours with
Br.-,in v. Rulins, supra. There the plaintiff's land sank in consequence of the defendant's excavations, and it would have sunk
just the same, whether there was a house on it or not, and it was
held, as the sinking was not caused by the weight of the house,
that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, whether he had a right
to lateral support for his foundations or not, and that he was
entitled to recover for all the damage that ensued. So here the
injury to the kitchen wall should be considered ivith reference to
the amount of damages consequent on the actionable wrong committed by the defendants, and as a direct consequence of it. If
a man goes to great expense in laying out a level lawn, and a
neighboring excavation causes the land to sink without appreciable
damage to the land itself, and yet so as to mar the smoothness of
the lawn, would it be said that he had no right to damages ?
C. 3.-I am of opinion that this rule should be discharged. It was said that the plaintiff was entitled t,) the verdict,
and to some damages, and the case of Ashbyi] v. White was relied
on, where the returning officer refused to admit a vote, and the
voter maintained his action for this against the returning officer,
although the persons for 'whom he meant to vote were elected.
It is true that where you infringe on another man's legal right,
although no damage follows, you commit an actionable wrong:
but where there are two adjoining owners, and one of them does a
lawful act of ownership, without invading any right of his neighbor, and the act constitutes no harm to his neighbor taken by
itself-that may or may not become actionable according as
appreciable damage is committed. We cannot draw a distinct
line, but must consider the annoyance, and the circumstances
under which that annoyance arose. Thus, if there are adjoining
houses in London, and dancing in one of them causes a vibration
to no appreciable extent in the other, that is no cause of action;
bui if the houses were built so slightly that the vibration was
ERLE,
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serious, and the dancing was continued after notice, that might
become actionable. Many such cases might be put-as, for
instance, annoyance caused by a particular trade, as that of a
coffin-maker or a boiler-plate maker. Under some circumstances,
the acts complained of would be perfectly lawful; under others,
not.
Here the question arises between two adjoining owners, the
defendant having, in exercise of his rights of ownership, sunk a
well on his own land, and afterwards removed the supports and
filled it up. When, however, it had been filled up to the surface,
it turned out that improper materials had been used for the purpose, and there was a subsidence of nine inches in the centre of
the well. On the evidence, I think it must be taken that there
was a subsidence of particles towards the place where the well
had been, and aniongst them some particles of the plaintiff's land.
But then the question was left to the jury, Did the plaintiff suffer
any appreciable damage, supposing the building not to have been
there? and they said that he did not; and on that the verdict
was entered for the defendants. A lawful action may become
unlawful if there is a certain amount of damage attached to it,
and if there be unreasonable conduct, as between neighbors.
Where the defendant set up smelting works, and by noxious
vapors destroyed the vegetation on the plaintiff's land, there was
a good cause -of action; but the House of Lords said that if the
defendant had sent vapor from his works which did no sensible
or material (which I take to be the same as appreciable) injury,
there would have been no cause of action (see The St. Helen's
Smelting Co. v. Tipping, 13 W. R. 1083, 35 L. J. Q. B. 66).
J.-I am of the same opinion. The Chief Justice left
the case to the jury almost in the very words used in The St.
Helen's Smelting Co. v. Tipping. He said, did the sinking
cause any appreciable damage, i. e., which any of the senses
could discover, and that was leaving the case favorably for Mr.
Sharp; and the jury found it did not.
BYLES,

am of the same opinion. We are
MONTAGUE SMITH, J.-I
concluded by the finding of the jury. They said that, in point
of fact, there was no damage in the sense in which the law understands it. Mr. Sharpe says if there is subsidence there must
necessarily be damage, but it may be to an extent utterly inap-
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preciable. There is no injuriahere to support an action without
actual damage. In these cases the court will not act without the
assistance of the jury, and we must assume their finding, as to
whether there is or is not damage, to be correct.
Rule discharged.
The grounds upon which the court
came to their decision in the foregoing
case, seem to have been that the plaintiff
was only entitled to support for his land,
and not for any additional weight put
thereon ; that if the land bad been left
in its natural state the subsidence would
have caused no appreciable damage;
that actual damage is necessary to give
a right of action of this nature, and that
therefore the plaintiff had not proved
that upon which his right of action depended, viz., actual damage caused by
an illegal act of the defendant. Whether this decision be really in strict
accordance with former decisions and
with principles now long recognised, or
whether it be an instance of judge-made
law, it is equally deserving of attention,
The principle involved in the case is of
considerable importance. It is clear as
a general rule that where a loss is necessarily and directly caused to the plaintiff
by an illegal act of the defendant, the
plaintiff may recover compensation for
such loss. In the principal case it
was found by the jury at the trial
that the fall of the plaintiff's wall
was caused by the subsidence of the
plaintiff's land, which subsidence had
been caused by the excavation of the defendant's well. It would seem, therefore, that in such a case as this, the
plaintiff, in accordance with the ordinary
rule of law relating to the measure of
damages in actions like the present,
ought to be entitled to recover from the
defendant compensation for the loss
occasioned by the fall of his wall. But
the Court of Common Pleas argued that
as there would have been only an inappreciable loss iitfficted on the defendant

if the wall had not existed, the plaintiff
was not entitled to recover anything
merely because he had erected a wall
upon his land, for which he was not entitled to a right of support. This view of
the case may perhaps be conm-dered
fairly open to objection. It is true that
if there had been no wall upon the
plaintiff's land he would not have been
entitled to bring any action; and it was
very well pointed out in the judgment
of EnLE, C. J., that this is not a case in
which the law implies damage-not a
case of injuria sine damno--but it is necessary to prove actual damage. The
reason why the plaintiff could not have
brought an action if the wall had not
been injured is--not because the defendant's act was a lawful one,-but because
the damage caused thereby was so small
that it could not be estimated ; and actual
damage is the ground upon which the
action rests. It cannot be said that it
is lawful for one landowner to cause the
land of his neighbor to give way even to
the slightest extent; but it may well be
said that unless such giving way causes
appreciable damage, the plaintiff shall
not be entitled to an action ; in short,
such an action on the part of the defendant must be considered an unlawful act,
although not one necessarily giving a
right of action. The building of the
wall by the defendant was a perfectly
lawful act, and the excavation of the
defendant to such an extent as to cause
the plaintiff's land to give way was unlawful. Of course there could be no
doubt but that the fall of the wall was
directly caused by the defendant's excaration. We have thus the fact that the
unlawful act of the defendant caused a

